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ABSTRACT 
 
Few policies are as universally accepted as raising primary school enrolment in 
developing countries, but the policy levers for achieving this goal are not straight 
forward.  This paper merges household survey data with detailed school supply 
characteristics from official sources, in order to estimate the relative impact of demand- 
and supply-side determinants of rural primary school enrolment in Mozambique.  Policy 
simulations based on a set of “plausible” interventions show that demand-side 
interventions, particularly those aimed at raising rural adult literacy, will have the biggest 






2. Data and Description of Study Area...........................................................................5 
The Study Area...............................................................................................5 
The National Education System......................................................................6 
Household Data...............................................................................................6 
School Data.....................................................................................................7 
Choice of School Characteristics....................................................................9 
3. Econometric Model, Sample, and Results................................................................11 
Econometric Model and Sample...................................................................11 
Basic Results.................................................................................................12 
Results on School Quality.......................................................................12 
Results on School Efficiency..................................................................14 
Coverage of the Educational System (School Access)...........................15 
 
Interactions with Household Characteristics ................................................16 
Placement of School Infrastructure...............................................................18 
4. Policy Simulations....................................................................................................20 
Supply Side Simulations...............................................................................21 
Demand Side Simulations.............................................................................23 
5. Conclusions...............................................................................................................25 
Tables..............................................................................................................................29 
References.......................................................................................................................42   vii 
TABLES 
1 Adult literacy rates, by age group (percent)..............................................................31 
2 Children’s current enrolment by age group (percent)...............................................31 
3 Means for administrative post school characteristics ...............................................31 
4 Marginal impact of school quality indicators on EP1 enrolment .............................32 
5 Marginal impact of school efficiency indicators on EP1 enrolment.........................33 
6 Marginal impact of school access indicators on EP1 enrolment..............................34 
7 Estimation results of school quality indicators interacted with 
  head’s literacy and household income................................................................35 
 
8 Estimation results of school efficiency indicators interacted with  
  head’s literacy and household income................................................................36 
 
9 Estimation results of school access indicators interacted with 
   head’s literacy and household income...............................................................37 
 
10 Determinations of school infrastructure in administrative post................................38 
11 Policy simulations of impact of school supply investment on  
  rural primary school EP1 enrolment...................................................................39 
 
12 Policy simulations of impact of household characteristics on  
  rural primary school EP1 enrolment (percent)....................................................40 
 
13 Summary statistics for children age 7-11..................................................................41   viii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
Thanks to Farizana Omar, Helder Zavale, and Virgolinho Nhate for excellent 
research assistance, to Manuel Rego of the Mozambique Ministry of Education for 
supplying and interpreting the data, and to Gaurav Datt, Dean Jolliffe, and Ken Simler, 
for helpful comments on earlier drafts.  This paper was written while the author was 





International Food Policy Research Institute   1
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Few policies, if any, are as universally accepted as that of raising primary school 
enrolment in poor countries.  Virtually every World Development Report published 
annually by the World Bank has recognized, in one form or another, the importance of 
primary schooling as an input to the social and economic progress of poor countries.
1  
And within the academic literature, a host of studies have documented the market and 
nonmarket returns that come from completing primary schooling, both in poor and rich 
countries alike.
2 
 But raising primary school enrolment in developing countries is easier said than 
done.  The relative importance of school supply versus household demand factors remain 
controversial, with serious implications for education policy.
3  For example, if children’s 
enrolment rates are not responsive to local school infrastructure, government 
interventions aimed at increasing access to schools will have very limited impact on 
overall schooling levels, thus effectively reducing the set of options available to 
policymakers.  And even if regional variations in schooling infrastructure can be related 
                                                 
1 Within the overall policy goal of raising primary school enrolment, raising girls enrolment has 
received special attention, due to the large positive externalities of female education on children’s and 
adult’s health, adult fertility, and infant mortality. 
2 For developing countries see Glewwe (1999), Handa (1999), and Lam and Duryea (1999).  For 
developed countries see Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983). 
3 See Simmons and Alexander (1978 for a discussion of this issue and review of the literature.   2
to household schooling choices, as several studies have shown,
4 efficient policy decisions 
require knowledge of the particular dimensions of school infrastructure that matter most.  
This latter issue is contentious in both developing and developed countries alike, and has 
been the topic of several recent articles seeking to measure the type of schooling 
infrastructure (access, quality, etc.) that makes a difference for household schooling 
choices.
5 
 This study makes three main contributions to the literature on primary school 
enrolment policies and school infrastructure in developing countries.  First, the impact of 
school characteristics on household primary school enrolment decisions are measured 
using a diverse set  of school “quality” indicators.  Aside from information on distance to 
the nearest school, detailed information on school characteristics is hard to find in 
developing countries, and as a result the available published literature is small relative to 
that for developed countries.
6  This study thus provides an additional set of estimates with 
which to assess the role of specific supply-side factors in determining student outcomes.  
Moreover, school characteristics are measured with the actual data that Mozambique’s 
Ministry of Education uses to formulate its regional and national targets, and to develop 
                                                 
4 These studies show that community or regional fixed effects are significant determinants of 
household schooling choices.  For examples, see Pradhan (1998) for Indonesia, Handa (1996) for Jamaica, 
and Alderman et al. (1996) for Pakistan. 
5 Recent studies that measure the effect of various school characteristics in developing countries 
include Lavy (1996) and Glewwe et al. (1995); for developed countries, see Card and Kruger (1992), Betts 
(1995), and Goldhaber and Brewer (1997).  The overall importance of school quality is discussed in 
Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald (1994), Hanushek (1995), and Kremer (1995).  
6 Recent studies that provide estimates of detailed school “quality” indicators on student 
educational achievement in developing countries include Glewwe and Jacoby (1994) for Ghana, Glewwe et 
al. (1995) for Jamaica, and Tan et al. (1997) for the Philippines.   3
its five-year plans, thus enhancing the policy relevance of the work.  Second, unlike most 
previous studies in this area, the interaction between school and household characteristics 
are explored to see if complementarity or substitutability exists between these two sets of 
factors in determining school enrolment.
7  The existence of significant interactions can 
provide important clues about who benefits the most from school supply interventions, 
and where programs or resources should be placed in order to benefit the most 
vulnerable.  For example, a significant positive interaction between household income 
and school access in a particular region implies that building additional schools in this 
region will benefit richer households more than poorer ones.  However, policymakers 
may want to target regions where the poor are more likely to benefit from the provision 
of schools, hence knowledge of specific interactions can provide useful information to 
help prioritize program placement. 
 Third, policy simulations are presented based on separate and “plausible” supply- 
and demand-side interventions, and used to evaluate which type of intervention will have 
the largest impact on primary school enrolment rates.  The standard “policy analysis” 
contained in studies on school supply typically evaluates the effect on the outcome of 
interest (for example, test scores or grade attainment) for a given change in a statistically 
significant school supply variable (e.g., travel time to school) by multiplying the given 
change by the relevant coefficient.  Although statistically valid, the policy relevance of 
this exercise can be enhanced significantly by recognizing that governments in the short 
                                                 
7  Birdsall (1985) is one of the few studies that also looks at interactions among supply and 
demand factors in determining schooling outcomes.    4
or medium run cannot supply 10 more books to every school, nor fix every leaking roof 
in the country.  A typical policy intervention in the short run will involve adding more 
teachers in some regions and not others, or building a few schools in a few regions.  This 
paper estimates the change in primary school enrolment that would come about from a set 
of more realistic interventions such as building a few schools in specific regions, or 
targeting adult education or income generating programs only among the poorest 
households.  These simulations arguably provide a better picture of the expected benefits 
of the type of interventions available to developing country governments in the short and 
medium term. 
 The data used in this paper are from Mozambique, a country that has suffered 
from over 25 years of armed conflict, and which is acknowledged by development 
experts as one of the world’s poorest.  Estimates from the rural region of this country 
show that both demand and supply factors are important determinants of primary school 
enrolment.  On the supply side, dimensions of school quality (the number of trained 
teachers), efficiency (pass rates), and access, all  have significant effects on household 
enrolment decisions.  However, the policy simulations unambiguously show that 
demand-side constraints, especially the education of adult household members, are the 
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2. DATA ON AND DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA 
 
THE STUDY AREA 
 Mozambique is one of only a handful of African countries that was colonized by 
the Portuguese, and by all accounts, the period of colonization was extremely repressive 
for native Africans.  Only a select few assimilados were allowed access to the social and 
economic benefits that the colonial rulers enjoyed, and independence came in 1975 only 
after a long war of independence and a change in government in Portugal.  Almost 
immediately after independence, the new Mozambique entered an even more brutal civil 
war, instigated by guerrillas backed by neighboring South Africa.  This war of 
destabilization resulted in thousands of land mines being placed in rural areas in the 
central and northern parts of the country.  Hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans fled 
the countryside for the urban centers or neighboring Malawi and Zimbabwe.  The signing 
of the peace treaty in Rome in 1992 essentially marked the second independence of 
Mozambique, but the over 25 years of armed conflict have left a huge hole in social and 
economic infrastructure that require immediate attention in order for Mozambique to 
realize sustainable growth and reduce poverty.  A recent study by the Ministry of Finance 
(1998) estimates that 70 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, with 
poverty rates even higher in the central and northern zones that suffered most from the 
civil war.  
   6
THE NATIONAL EDUCATION SYSTEM 
 The national education system’s general education program is divided into two 
levels—primary and secondary.  Primary education consists of 7 years of schooling 
divided into two levels, level 1 up to grade 5 (escola primaria do primeiro grãu or EP1) 
and level 2 from grade 6 to 7 (escola primária do segundo grãu or EP2).  Secondary 
education consists of 5 years also divided into two levels or cycles:  first cycle secondary 
from grade 8 to 10 (escola secundária geral do primeiro grãu or ESG1) and second cycle 
secondary from grade 11 to 12 (escola secundária geral do segundo grãu or ESG2). 
 Unlike most African countries, entrance into successively higher levels of 
schooling is not based on national examinations, but on actual grades and age.  Among 
students with the same grades, those who are younger (and therefore either started on 
time or did not repeat as often) are given priority.  Access to EP1 is not thought to be 
supply constrained, but there are supply constraints for all other (higher) schooling levels.  
Fees do not exist in public lower primary schools, but there is an annual matriculation fee 
of approximately $5.  Private EP1 school fees can range from $150 to $600 per year, 
depending on ownership structure and facilities provided. 
 
HOUSEHOLD DATA 
 The household data used in this paper come from the first post-war national 
household survey of Mozambique undertaken in 1996/97 by the National Statistical 
Institute—the Inquérito Nacional Aos Agregados Familiares Sobre As Condições de Vida 
(IAF).  The IAF is a multipurpose household survey much like the Living Standard   7
Measurement Surveys developed by the World Bank, and contains detailed information 
on consumption expenditures, as well as modules on health (both adult and child), 
education, employment, demographic composition, and a community questionnaire for 
rural areas describing local infrastructure.
8 
 The IAF is a three-staged stratified sample.  Stage one is the 11 provinces of the 
country, stage 2 is the localidad (bairro in urban areas), and in stage 3 households are 
selected from villages (or blocks in urban areas).  The primary sampling unit is therefore 
the localidad, and variance estimates provided in this paper account for the sample design 
of the survey.  The full survey covers approximately 42,000 individuals residing in 8,250 
households. 
 Tables 1 and 2 provide basic indicators of adult and child schooling calculated 
from the IAF data set.  Only 40 percent of adults aged 18-65 can read or write; for 
women, the literacy rate is even lower (24 percent).  Note that women in rural areas have 
the lowest literacy rates—16 percent for the 18-65 age group.  Table 2 indicates that there 
are significant signs of improvement.  The net enrolment rate for primary school is 49 
percent, and is slightly lower for girls (45 percent) and rural children (44 percent).  
 
SCHOOL DATA 
 Information on school infrastructure in the IAF is limited to whether or not a rural 
village contains a primary school.  Detailed information on school characteristics has 
                                                 
8  This data set has been used by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in 
collaboration with the Mozambican Ministry of Finance to construct a national poverty line and to develop 
a poverty profile of Mozambique (Ministry of Finance 1998).   8
been gathered from the Direcção de Planificação of the Mozambique Ministry of 
Education (MINED).  Since 1992 MINED has administered a beginning- and end-of-
academic-year questionnaire to each school in the country, soliciting information on 
enrolment, teachers, teacher qualifications, pass rates, and building characteristics.  This 
information is used by MINED to create and keep track of its internal performance 
indicators.  Coverage is excellent, with over 90 percent of schools returning 
questionnaires; summaries of these data are published in an annual report by the MINED 
titled “Educational Indicators.” 
 Raw data from these school surveys for 1995 and 1996 were acquired from 
MINED and merged at the administrative post level with rural households from the IAF 
survey.
9  The analysis presented below focuses on the enrolment decision of rural 
children (representing 80 percent of the primary school-age children in Mozambique) in 
order to exploit the small information on rural village-level schooling availability 
provided in the IAF; in all there are 634 villages in the IAF, distributed across 175 
administrative posts, 112 districts, and the 10 provinces of the country (excluding the 





                                                 
9 There are three levels of local administration in Mozambique: province, district, and 
administrative post.  The school-level data are therefore aggregated to the lowest administrative unit 
possible. 
10 In 17 cases, MINED did not have any school information for an administrative post found in the 
IAF.  In these cases, school information from a bordering administrative post was used.   9
CHOICE OF SCHOOL CHARACTERISTICS 
 MINED divides its educational performance indicators into three groups, 
measuring coverage, quality, and efficiency of the school system, and I follow this 
classification in order for the results to be of policy relevance to the Government of 
Mozambique.  MINED has developed a set of indicators to measure each of the three 
dimensions of the educational system—where possible, I use these same indicators in the 
regression analysis, although there is a high degree of collinearity among the indicators, 
both across and within the three dimensions of coverage, quality, and efficiency. 
 The basic quality indicators used by MINED are the number of trained teachers 
working in the system, average class size, and the pupil-teacher ratio.  I use the number 
of trained teachers in the administrative post as my basic indicator of teacher quality.  
However, I also find that gender of the teachers matters, and so show some results that 
measure the number and proportion of female trained teachers in the administrative post.  
In addition to teacher training, I include the average pupil-teacher ratio for schools in the 
administrative post.  Class size is not used because many schools in Mozambique are run 
on a shift system, and so smaller class sizes can be achieved by creating two shifts, but 
with only a small number of additional teachers (Case and Deaton 1999) report the same 
phenomenon for South Africa). 
 MINED measures the internal efficiency of the educational system by the pass rate 
(total pass rate, and pass rates by gender and subject), and the proportion of students who 
are repeating a class.  The pass rate and repeat rate are highly collinear so I focus on the 
former, and construct the average pass rate of schools in the administrative post in the   10
previous year as my measure of school efficiency.  The previous year pass rate (collected 
in the end-of-year survey in 1995) is the relevant variable since school enrolment 
decisions are made at the beginning of the year when the pass rate for the current year is 
still unknown. 
 School coverage is measured by the number of level one primary schools (EP1) in 
the administrative post.  Given the large variations in the building structure of schools in 
Mozambique, and evidence from other developing countries on the importance of 
building characteristics (e.g., Glewwe and Jacoby 1994), I also include the number of 
school rooms made of cement in the administrative post.  Finally, Lavy (1996) argues 
that the availability of higher levels of schooling can be an important factor in raising 
primary school enrolment rates, and Appleton et al. (1996) also point out that part of the 
return to primary school education is that it opens up the possibility of acquiring higher 
levels of schooling.  With these arguments in mind, I construct indicators of whether the 
administrative post has a second level (EP2) primary school, and a secondary school, to 
see if these influence the lower primary enrolment decision. 
 Recall that all school supply variables are measured at the administrative post 
level, so each household in the administrative post will have the same school 
infrastructure characteristics.  Also included is the indicator of whether or not an EP1 
school exists in the village, taken from the IAF community questionnaire—this controls 
for the very important travel time cost component of school attendance, as well as allows 
for some village variation in school infrastructure.  As in other Sub-Saharan African 
countries, girls schooling rates lag behind those of boys in Mozambique and is thus of   11
particular policy importance.  I allow the impact of all school infrastructure variables to 
differ by gender, estimating separate models for boys and girls—significant differences in 
coefficient estimates by gender are noted where applicable.  
 Table 3 provides means of the school supply variables used in the regression 
analysis.  These means are calculated over the 175 administrative posts found in the rural 
sample of the IAF, and show that the mean number of EP1 schools is 21, with an average 
of one cement room per school.  Only 59 percent of the administrative posts have a level 
2 primary school (EP2), and only 20 percent have a secondary school.   
 
3.  ECONOMETRIC MODEL, SAMPLE, AND RESULTS 
 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND SAMPLE 
 The impact of school characteristics on household schooling decisions is 
measured via reduced form demand equations for children’s schooling of the form 
Si = F(Xc, Xh, Xs, u), (1) 
where Xc are characteristics of the individual child (age), Xh are household characteristics 
that capture access to resources, differences in taste for schooling, and opportunity costs, 
Xs is the vector of school infrastructural characteristics discussed above, and u is a 
random error term with the usual assumptions.
11  The household-level variables included 
in the model are the age and sex of the head, whether the head is literate, whether any 
adult household member has completed grade 7 (EP2), and whether any adult female has 
                                                 
11  See Strauss and Thomas (1995) for a review of this methodology.   12
completed grade 5 (EP1).  Household resources are measured with per capita daily 
expenditure on all goods and services, including home production.  This is treated as 
endogenous following the recommendation of Rivers and Vuong (1988), using the cluster 
median expenditure for identification.
12  Also included are measures of farm assets and 
production such as total landholdings, access to irrigation, agricultural 
commercialization, and provincial dummy variables.  
 For Mozambique (and most African countries), raising primary school enrolment 
rates is a priority and the focus is therefore on the analysis of school supply effects on the 
primary school enrolment decisions of rural households.  The sample is children of 
primary school age (7-11 years old), and the dependent variable is whether the child was 
currently enrolled in school at the time of the survey.  Means for these variables are 
presented in Table 13. 
 
BASIC RESULTS 
Results on School Quality 
Table 4 presents probit marginal probability estimates of the impact of school 
quality on EP1 enrolment by gender in rural Mozambique.  Column 1 presents the base 
estimates with quality measured by the number of trained teachers and the average 
administrative post-level pupil-teacher ratio; the latter is insignificant but the former is 
                                                 
12 Household consumption decisions also affect leisure consumption, and are made jointly with 
schooling decisions.  Due to this simultaneity problem, median per capita consumption of the village is 
used to instrument household consumption.  This variable is highly correlated with household 
consumption: the simple OLS coefficient of log (consumption) on log (cluster median consumption) is 
0.88.   13
positive and significant, although the quantitative effect is small.
13  Adding 10 more 
trained teachers will raise the probability of enrolment by one percentage point.  On the 
other hand, having a school present in the village will raise the probability of enrolment 
by approximately 20 percentage points for both boys and girls. 
 When the total number of trained teachers is split into the number of male and 
female teachers and entered as two variables, only the number of male trained teachers is 
significant, but this is because there are so few trained female teachers (an average of 11 
per administrative post, or roughly 11 percent of all teachers per region).
14  However 
other indicators of the gender composition of the teaching staff seem to matter.  Columns 
(2)-(4) replicate the base estimates with measures of the proportion of trained female 
teachers among all teachers, the proportion of all teachers who are female, and the 
proportion of all female teachers that are trained.  Most of these alternative measures of 
gender composition and training are positive and significant determinants of enrolment, 
with the largest marginal effects coming from the variable measuring the proportion of 
trained female teachers among all teachers.  The mean of this variable is 0.08—doubling 
this would increase enrolment by just over 4 percentage points for both boys and girls.  
The mean proportion of female teachers across the administrative posts is 37 percent—
taking this up to 50 percent would increase enrolment by 4 and 5 percentage points for 
boys and girls, respectively. 
                                                 
13 When the proportion of teachers who are trained is used, its coefficient is positive but not 
significant. 
14 The results based on number of male and female trained teachers entered separately, are not 
shown, but are available from the author on request.   14
 A recent participatory study sponsored by OXFAM (1999) in Mozambique 
reports that male teachers often force students to perform chores for them such as 
fetching wood and water, and that parents are reluctant to send girls to school to be taught 
by male teachers.  This is especially true in the heavily Moslem provinces of Zambezia 
and Nampula, and may explain the strong positive effect of female teachers reported in 
Table 4. 
 
Results on School Efficiency 
 Table 5 presents probit marginal probability estimates of the impact of school 
efficiency (measured by the pass rate of the previous year) characteristics on school 
enrolment.
15  The total pass rate estimates in column (1) are not significant, but when 
male and female pass rates are distinguished, female pass rates appear to have a 
significant positive affect on enrolment probabilities, but not male pass rates.  Moreover, 
the measured effect is not statistically different between boys and girls.  Raising the girl 
pass rate to the level of boys (an increase of 11 percentage points) will raise the 
probability of enrolment by 12 percentage points for boys and 9 percentage points for 
girls.  The reason why households would respond to the female pass rate and not male is 
unclear.  One explanation might be that the female pass rate is a better indicator of school 
quality because of girls’ overall poorer performance in school. 
                                                 
15 Estimates for the household-level variables are robust to model specification, and so are 
suppressed from Tables 5 and 6 for convenience.  Full results are available from the author.   15
 The OXFAM (1999) participatory study of household attitudes towards children’s 
schooling indicated that learning Portuguese and learning to ‘fazer as contas’ (do 
accounting) are important motivations for sending children to school.  Columns (3) and 
(4) include the Portuguese language and mathematics subject pass rates as measures of 
schooling efficiency, but neither of these are significant determinants of EP1 enrolment 
in the sample. 
 
Coverage of the Educational System (School Access) 
Estimation results using indicators of school access within the administrative post 
are reported in Table 6.  The number of schools in the administrative post has a 
significant effect on boys but not girls enrolment (p-value for difference in effects is 
0.04), while the number of cement rooms has a significant effect on girls but not boys 
enrolment (p-value for difference is 0.08).  The possibility of further education also raises 
the probability of primary school enrolment.  The coefficient indicating whether the 
region has a secondary school is significant for both girls and boys, with enrolment 
probabilities being approximately 9 percentage points higher in administrative posts with 
at least one secondary school.  The lack of significance of the presence of an EP2 school 
is somewhat surprising.  However, the underlying data indicate that in fact virtually every 
region (all but one) with a secondary school also has at least one EP2 school, hence the 
secondary school indicator is picking up the effect of both EP2 and secondary schooling 
possibilities in the region.  When all school access variables are simultaneously included 
in the model, the EP2 and secondary school indicators become insignificant (column (3),   16
but the significant effects of the number of EP1 schools (for boys) and cement rooms (for 
girls) is maintained. 
 
INTERACTIONS WITH HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS 
  The influence of community infrastructure (such as school quality) may be 
different in households with different characteristics.  For example, the impact of a 
village school may be greater for richer households if these households are better able to 
take advantage of the school.  On the other hand, richer households may be able to afford 
to send children to a neighboring village for schooling, in which case the impact of 
constructing a school in the village may actually be greater among poorer households, 
who otherwise would not have sent their children to study.  The impact of community 
infrastructure on household behavior may also depend on the education of adults or 
parents, due to differences in preferences or access to information.  In the child health 
literature, for example, the impact of mother’s education has been found to vary 
significantly with community characteristics such as sewerage and sanitation conditions 
(Thomas, Strauss, and Henriques 1991; Barrera 1990). 
 Both household income (measured by expenditures per capita) and adult 
education significantly influence schooling choices in Mozambique, and school 
infrastructure also conditions these choices in rural areas.  Does the impact of school 
infrastructure depend on household characteristics?  Are certain households more likely 
than others to change their schooling decisions in response to variations in school 
infrastructure?  I address these questions by interacting the different school supply   17
characteristics with household adult education (measured by the literacy of the head) and 
household income, to see if significant interactions indeed exist between school supply 
and household characteristics.  The interactions are tested sequentially, first by 
interacting the school supply variables with head’s literacy, and then by interacting the 
same variables with household (log) per capita consumption.  Results are presented 
separately for each of the three dimensions of school supply (quality, efficiency, and 
access) in Tables 7 through 9.   
Starting with school quality, Table 7 presents results of the interactions between 
each school quality indicator and head’s literacy (columns 1-4) and household 
consumption (columns 5-8).  For girls enrolment, the impact of both the proportion of 
trained female teachers and the proportion of female teachers depend on whether the head 
is literate or not.  The negative coefficient on the interaction term implies that these 
characteristics are substitutes, and therefore the impact of these dimensions of school 
quality are significantly greater among households where the head is not literate.  The 
results for income in columns 5-8 also show some significant interactions.  For girls, the 
presence of a school in the village and household income are substitutes, hence the 
positive impact of a school in the village will be greater among poorer households.  The 
other significant interaction is between income and the proportion of trained female 
teachers in the administrative post, the post coefficient in this case implying 
complementarity (column 6). 
 Table 8 presents results of the estimates of school efficiency indicators interacted 
with head’s literacy (columns 1-4) and household consumption (columns 5-8).  There are   18
no significant interactions among schooling efficiency, head’s education, and household 
consumption.  The negative and statistically significant coefficients for income*village 
are consistent with those in Table 6—constructing a school in the village will have a 
larger impact on the enrolment of girls from poorer households compared to richer ones. 
 The last set of estimates relate to interactions among school access, head’s 
education, and household income, and these are reported in Table 9.  Significant 
interactions exist among several access indicators and household income (columns 4-6).  
The positive impact of cement classrooms on girls enrolment is enhanced among richer 
households, given by the positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term in 
column 4.  In column 5, there is a significant interaction effect between presence of an 
EP2 school in the administrative post and household income for girls, with the positive 
coefficient implying complementarity.  This is probably due to the fact that richer 
households can better afford to send girls away to an EP2 school once they have 
completed EP1. 
 
PLACEMENT OF SCHOOL INFRASTRUCTURE 
 The analysis of the impact of school infrastructure on school enrolment runs the 
risk of confounding cause and effect if, as one might expect, households with a greater 
preference for schooling are able to move to areas with better schooling quality.  In the 
United States for example, households demonstrate preference for schooling quality 
through higher property prices in districts with better schools.  In Mozambique and other 
poor countries, allocation of infrastructure such as school or health services may be   19
influenced by local demand for services.  In such cases, regression estimates that do not 
account for endogenous program placement will overstate the impact of school 
characteristics on household educational choices. 
 Mozambique’s history of armed conflict led to destruction of physical 
infrastructure including schools, roads, and health centers, and formal provision of 
educational centers by the state was limited to the southern part of the country and to 
mostly urban zones.  During this period very few new schools were constructed, and 
many of these were constructed through community initiatives that would reflect 
community preferences for schooling.  Since the peace accord in 1992 and the general 
elections of 1994, there has been a rapid increase in the number of schools constructed in 
the rural areas, due to both government and NGO interventions.  According to the IAF 
community questionnaire, nearly 40 percent of village primary schools were constructed 
after 1992. 
 To evaluate the extent to which our estimates of the impact of school 
infrastructure on school enrolment reflect endogenous placement effects, selected school 
supply characteristics are regressed on a set of variables describing the general 
socioeconomic level of households in the administrative post.  These regressions are 
estimated over the 175 administrative posts in the IAF rural sample, and results for the 
number of EP1 school (column 1), number of trained teachers (column 2), and the pupil-
teacher ratio (column 3), are presented in Table 10.  In all three regressions, the set of 
variables describing the average household socioeconomic level in the administrative 
post is jointly significant in explaining the variation in the three school quality indicators.    20
The key characteristic of the administrative post appears to be the proportion of 
households with an adult female with EP1 education, or the proportion of household 
heads that are literate.  Notice that median per capita consumption of the administrative 
post is not a significant determinant of school infrastructure.  Columns (1a), (2a), and 
(3a) add district fixed effects (dummy variables) to the regression equations as in 
Alderman et al. (1996).  Inclusion of these district fixed effects eliminates the joint 
significance of the SES variables—Alderman et al. interpret this result in the Pakistan 
context to imply that it is inter-district variations rather than variations in administrative 
post-level household characteristics that determine school infrastructure.  However, the 
statistical validity of this result may be questionable, given that there are 112 districts 
spread over the 175 administrative posts and thus an average of less than 2 administrative 
posts per district. 
 In conclusion, given the process of school infrastructure placement in 
Mozambique, as well as the regression analysis presented in this section, it is possible 
that some of the estimated effects of school quality may represent unobserved household- 
or community-level tastes for schooling. 
 
4.  POLICY SIMULATIONS 
 
 According to the Ministry of Education’s strategic plan, raising basic primary 
education levels is a priority for Mozambique.  In this section I compare the relative 
impact of demand-side versus supply-side interventions on primary school enrolment   21
rates in rural Mozambique.  The simulations are based on the probit regressions for the 
determinants of current enrolment of children aged 7-11 years old in rural areas.  The 
school characteristics included in the model are the number of trained teachers and the 
pupil-teacher ratio, and the number of schools and cement rooms in the administrative 
post.  All the household-level characteristics mentioned above are included in the model, 
as well as the variable indicating presence of a school in the village.  Because of 
Mozambique’s vast size and geographical and economic heterogeneity, I allow the 
impact of the hypothetical policy interventions to vary by province by interacting the 
policy variables with provincial dummy variables.  I do not find systematic differences in 
the effect of policy interventions on boys and girls enrolment rates and so provide 
estimates for the full sample only. 
 
SUPPLY-SIDE SIMULATIONS 
 The supply-side policy simulations consider the impact on enrolment rates of 
increasing the number of schools in rural areas in Mozambique.  The IAF community 
questionnaire indicates that approximately 69 percent of rural villages have a basic 
primary school, and the regression analysis shows that presence of a school in the village 
is an extremely important determinant of children’s enrolment.  I calculate the increase in 
EP1 enrolment that would occur due to three separate interventions: (1) increasing the 
proportion of villages with EP1 schools to 79 percent, which implies building a school in 
6 villages per province; (2) increasing the proportion of villages with EP1 to 89 percent,   22
which implies building schools in 12 villages per province; (3) increasing the EP1 
coverage rate to 100 percent by ensuring that all villages have a primary school.   
 In order to capture the impact of school characteristics (and not just access) on 
enrolment, I assume that each school consists of three cement rooms and comes with two 
trained teachers.  The addition of a school in a village will have a direct impact on the 
village and an indirect impact on all villages in the administrative post through the 
administrative post-level variables:  the number of schools, the number of cement school 
rooms, and the number of trained teachers in the administrative post.  The indirect effects 
due to changes at the administrative post level are accounted for in the policy 
simulations. 
 Results of these simulations are presented in Table 11, which also provides 
baseline figures for predicted enrolment (calculated from the probit estimates without any 
simulations) and the EP1 coverage for each province as well as nationally.  The numbers 
in column (3), associated with the policy of increasing EP1 coverage to 79 percent, will 
increase overall enrolment by 6 percent, but with substantial regional variations.  Maputo 
Province (16 percent), Niassa (10 percent), and Manica (10 percent) would be the biggest 
beneficiaries of this intervention.  Doubling the size of the intervention would roughly 
double the size of the impact.  Constructing 12 more schools per province would increase 
overall enrolment by 13 percent, with the largest increases in enrolment occurring in 
Maputo Province (31 percent), Niassa (25 percent), and Manica and Sofala (both with 23 
percent). 
   23
DEMAND-SIDE SIMULATIONS 
 The impact of policy interventions designed to influence demand-side (or 
household) characteristics are based on the same model used in the simulations presented 
above.  Two types of interventions are simulated, one influencing household income (or 
consumption) and the other influencing adult education.  The income-related 
interventions involve raising the per capita consumption of all households to at least the 
level of consumption of the 25
th percentile of the per capita consumption distribution (Mt. 
2,494 per person per day in the IAF, or approximately US$0.25); the second policy is to 
raise all households to at least Mt. 3,584, which is equal to median consumption in the 
IAF.  Since these interventions only affect poor households, they will not be evenly 
distributed throughout the country.  In particular, the poorer the province, the larger the 
share of households in the bottom 25
th percentile or bottom half of the per capita 
consumption distribution, and thus the larger the number of households who will be 
affected by the policy. 
 Columns (4) and (5) of Table 12 provide estimates of the percentage change in 
enrolment due to the two income-related policy interventions described above.  The 
overall (national) impact is to raise enrolment rates by 2 and 5 percent, respectively, for 
policies 1 and 2—these effects are smaller than the estimated enrolment effects of 
building more schools presented in Table 11.  Note that the income policy impact is 
largest in Sofala and Inhambane, the two poorest provinces.  This is due not only to the 
size of the coefficient of the province*consumption interaction term, but also to the fact 
that more households in these provinces benefit from the policy.   24
 The previous analysis in this paper indicated that adult household education 
significantly conditions children’s schooling.  I simulate the impact on enrolment rates if 
all household heads in the bottom quartile of the per capita expenditure distribution were 
literate.  As in the income case, the benefits of this intervention will not be distributed 
equally across provinces.  While poorer provinces have more eligible households, the 
policy only affects heads of household who are not literate and so the proportion of heads 
who are literate also matters. 
 Columns (6) and (7) of Table 12 present simulation results based on interventions 
that raise the literacy level of heads of household in the bottom parts of the per capita 
consumption distribution.  The most important result is that the overall impact of this 
intervention is substantially larger than the income or school access interventions.  
Increasing literacy of heads in the bottom quartile would increase overall enrolment by 
18 percent; increasing literacy of heads in the bottom half of the distribution would 
increase enrolment rates by 28 percent.  
 Once again there are substantial regional variations in the impact of adult 
education interventions on primary school enrolment.  The biggest effects are estimated 
in Niassa (49 percent), Sofala (37 percent), Tete (31 percent), and Inhambane (31 
percent).  This is partly due to more beneficiary households in these provinces: 
Inhambane and Sofala are the two poorest provinces, and Tete and Niassa have the 
lowest literacy rates for household heads. 
 These simulations provide an idea of the overall benefit of different policy 
interventions without considering the cost of these same interventions.  A comparison of   25
the different options indicates that interventions that increase adult literacy (or 
alternatively, which affect preferences for schooling), will have the largest pay-off in 
terms of increased enrolment rates.  However, this intervention may be much more costly 




 Raising primary school enrolment is a major development imperative, although 
the interventions that can best raise enrolment are not always straightforward, and can 
vary both between and within countries.  Using the first national household survey of 
Mozambique, coupled with detailed information on school infrastructure supplied by the 
Ministry of Education, this paper evaluates the relative importance of supply- versus 
demand-side factors in determining rural primary school enrolment.  Simulations based 
on a set of “plausible” demand- and supply-side interventions indicate that in rural 
Mozambique, demand-side interventions will have a bigger impact on enrolment rates 
than supply-side factors, although the relative cost of these competing interventions is not 
analyzed.  On the demand side, it is the education of adult household members that seems 
most important in stimulating child enrolment.  Making household heads literate in the 
bottom per capita consumption quartile will raise rural primary school enrolment by 18 
percent, with the largest increases occurring in the provinces of Niassa and Sofala.  In 
contrast, building six more schools in each province will raise rural enrolment by only 6   26
percent, and bringing per capita consumption of the poorest quartile up to Mt. 2,494 per 
day will raise rural enrolment by a mere 2 percent. 
 The detailed analysis of the impact of school characteristics on primary school 
enrolment in rural Mozambique indicates that dimensions of school quality, access or 
availability, and efficiency, all work to stimulate enrolment, although the effects are 
small and differ somewhat by gender of child.  School quality, measured by the number 
of trained teachers in the administrative post, has a positive and significant impact on 
enrolment, but it is the gender composition of the teaching staff that is even more 
important in determining the household decision to send children to school.  Both the 
simple proportion of teachers who are female, as well as the share of trained female 
teachers among all teachers are important positive determinants of enrolment rates.  
Raising the proportion of female teachers from 0.37 to 0.50 in the administrative post will 
raise enrolment rates by roughly 5 percentage points. 
 Both school efficiency and availability also have gender-differentiated effects on 
enrolment rates.  For efficiency, raising the female pass rate to the level of boys will raise 
enrolment for boys and girls by 12 and 9 percentage points, respectively, although the 
overall pass rate and the boys pass rate do not significantly affect enrolment rates.  
Finally, the presence of an EP1 school in the village increases enrolment for both sexes 
by approximately 20 percentage points, and the impact of school availability is enhanced 
for girls if the school is built with cement. 
 Few previous studies have considered the possible interaction between school 
supply indicators and households characteristics.  In Mozambique, these exist, but only   27
for girls enrolment.  In terms of policy, the most interesting of these is the negative 
interaction between presence of a school in the village and household income.  This 
implies that the two factors are substitutes—construction of a village school will increase 
girls enrolment by more among poorer households.    29
 
TABLES 
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Table 1—Adult literacy rates, by age group (percent) 
  18-65 Years    66-99 Years 
  Rural    Urban    Mozambique    Rural    Urban    Mozambique 
                       
All  32.0    71.0    40.0    29.7    69.2    37.7 
Male  52.3    85.1    59.3    42.9    78.4    50.3 
Female  15.7    57.6    23.6    17.5    60.2    26.0 
Poor  31.2    61.8    36.6    28.4    59.1    34.2 
 
 
Table 2—Children’s current enrolment, by age group (percent) 
  7-11 Years    12-17 Years 
  Rural    Urban    Mozambique    Rural    Urban    Mozambique 
                       
All  43.9    70.7    49.2    43.3    63.5    48.0 
Male  49.1    73.5    53.9    51.5    65.6    54.5 
Female  39.0    68.0    44.7    33.2    61.4    40.3 
Poor  41.7    63.3    45.5    42.3    54.9    44.8 
 
 
Table 3—Means for administrative post school characteristics 
  Mean 
Coverage or access indicators   
 Number of EP1 schools  21 
 Number of cement rooms  22 
 EP2 school exists  0.59 
 Secondary school exists  0.20 
Quality indicators   
 Number of trained teachers  66 
 Number of female trained teachers/total number of teachers  0.08 
 Number of female teachers/total number of teachers  0.37 
 Number of trained female teachers/total number of female teachers  0.15 
Efficiency indicators   
 Overall pass rate  0.64 
 Female pass rate  0.57 
 Male pass rate  0.68 
 Portuguese pass rate  0.66 
 Mathematics pass rate  0.68 
   32
Table 4—Marginal impact of school quality indicators on EP1 enrolment 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls 
Log p.c. consumption  0.060  0.062  0.056  0.056  0.058  0.058  0.059  0.060 
  (1.77)  (2.01)  (1.64)  (1.79)  (1.70)  (0.86)  (1.74)  (1.93) 
Residual
a  0.112  0.058  0.117  0.063  0.113  0.059  0.112  0.059 
  (2.75)  (1.56)  (2.94)  (1.71)  (2.81)  (1.62)  (2.78)  (1.63) 
Head literate  0.112  0.148  0.114  0.152  0.118  0.152  0.115  0.152 
  (3.84)  (5.72)  (3.87)  (5.77)  (3.97)  (5.76)  (3.90)  (5.79) 
Adult with EP2  0.151  0.200  0.153  0.201  0.152  0.200  0.151  0.198 
  (3.12)  (4.16)  (3.14)  (4.20)  (3.14)  (4.19)  (3.12)  (4.17) 
Female adult with EP1  0.132  0.296  0.126  0.205  0.135  0.212  0.132  0.216 
  (2.41)  (4.67)  (2.30)  (4.35)  (2.50)  (4.55)  (2.44)  (4.71) 
Age of child in years  0.074  0.049  0.074  0.047  0.074  0.047  0.074  0.047 
  (8.88)  (6.61)  (8.97)  (6.29)  (8.93)  (6.33)  (8.86)  (6.29) 
Village has school  0.218  0.185  0.228  0.193  0.223  0.189  0.227  0.192 
  (6.18)  (5.28)  (6.55)  (5.54)  (6.42)  (5.40)  (6.50)  (5.53) 
Pupil-teacher ratio  0.000  0.001  -0.000  0.001  -0.000  0.001  0.000  0.002 
  (0.32)  (1.02)  (0.12)  (0.96)  (0.12)  (0.94)  (0.13)  (1.26) 
Number of trained teachers  0.001  0.001             
  (4.52)  (2.66)             
Trained female teachers/all 
   teachers 
    0.523  0.540         
      (2.60)  (2.71)         
Proportion of teachers who 
   are female 
        0.299  0.418     
          (1.21)  (1.86)     
Proportion of female  
   teachers who are trained 
            0.313  0.347 
              (2.89)  (3.29) 
                 
Observations  2,182  2,281  2,182  2,281  2,182  2,281  2,182  2,281 
Log likelihood  -1,298  -1,316  -1,304  -1,316  -1,307  -1,318  -1,304  -1,314 
Notes:  Numbers shown are marginal probabilities derived from probit estimation, with absolute Z-statistics in 
parentheses.  School quality variables are measured at administrative post level, except for presence of school 
in village.   Constant term, provincial dummy variables, land holdings, possession of agricultural equipment, 
and indicator for commercial crop production not shown.  Mean of dependent variable is 0.51 and 0.40 for 
boys and girls respectively. 
a T-statistic is test for exogeneity of log p.c. expenditure.   33
Table 5—Marginal impact of school efficiency indicators on EP1 enrolment 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls 
Village has EP1 school  0.229  0.189  0.228  0.188  0.231  0.190  0.230  0.190 
  (6.64)  (5.33)  (6.58)  (5.32)  (6.68)  (5.36)  (6.67)  (5.35) 
Previous year pass rate  0.461  -0.326             
  (1.17)  (0.77)             
Female pass rate      1.103  0.845         
      (3.18)  (2.47)         
Male pass rate      -0.267  -0.699         
      (0.70)  (1.57)         
Pass rate in Portuguese          0.540  0.109     
          (1.44)  (0.28)     
Pass rate in math              0.584  0.007 
              (1.57)  (0.02) 
                 
Observations  2,182  2,281  2,182  2,281  2,182  2,281  2,182  2,281 
Log likelihood  -1,308.4  -1,321.8  -1,301.4  -1,317.2  -1,307.7  -1,322.3  -1,307.5  -1,322.4 
Notes:  Numbers shown are marginal probabilities derived from probit estimation, with absolute Z-statistics in 
parentheses.  School efficiency variables are measured at administrative post level and are for the previous 





   34
Table 6—Marginal impact of school access indicators on EP1 enrolment 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls 
Village has EP1 school  0.219  0.187  0.226  0.189  0.217  0.184 
  (6.27)  (5.30)  (6.35)  (5.23)  (6.11)  (5.16) 
Number of EP1 schools in APs  0.003  0.000      0.003  0.0003 
  (3.02)  (0.30)      (2.99)  (0.35) 
Number of cement classrooms in AP  0.001  0.002      0.000  0.002 
  (0.92)  (2.62)      (0.49)  (2.43) 
EP2 school in AP      -0.005  -0.035  -0.030  -0.056 
      (0.14)  (0.93)  (0.85)  (1.45) 
Secondary school in AP      0.096  0.082  0.075  0.036 
      (2.00)  (1.96)  (1.50)  (0.82) 
             
Observations  2,126  2,234  2,126  2,234  2,126  2,234 
Log likelihood  -1,300  -1,313  -1,275.6  -1,297.1  -1,267.9  -1,289.3 
Notes:  Numbers shown are marginal probabilities derived from probit estimation, with absolute Z-statistics 
in parentheses.  AP refers to administrative post, and sample is children aged 7-11 in rural Mozambique.  
Control variables are the same as in Table 4.  See text for details. 
 
    
 
 
Table 7—Estimation results of school quality indicators interacted with head’s literacy and household income 
  Interactions with head’s literacy  Interactions with household income 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Interactions with:  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls 
Village has school  -0.108  -0.057  -0.099  -0.068  -0.098  -0.060  -0.101  -0.066  -0.094  -0.122  -0.103 -0.111  -0.105  -0.115 -0.097  -0.105 
  (1.72)  (1.03)  (1.64)  (1.26)  (1.60)  (1.11)  (1.67)  (1.21)  (1.69)  (2.73)  (1.89)  (2.54)  (1.91)  (2.61)  (1.64)  (2.41) 
Pupil-teacher ratio  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.002 
  (0.25)  (0.09)  (0.19)  (0.34)  (0.02)  (0.40)  (0.17)  (0.03)  (0.71)  (1.33)  (0.62)  (0.77)  (0.49)  (0.83)  (0.68)  (1.29) 
Number of trained teachers  -0.000  -0.000              -0.000  0.000             
  (0.43)  (0.99)              (0.42)  (1.78)             
Trained female teachers/all 
teachers 
    -0.027  -0.394              0.042  0.463         
      (0.07)  (1.96)              (0.17)  (2.08)         
Proportion of teachers who are 
female 
        -0.127  -0.411              0.100  0.226     
          (0.49)  (2.29)              (0.48)  (1.13)     
Proportion of female teachers 
who are trained 
            0.069  -0.087              0.055  0.236 
              (0.38)  (0.71)              (0.38)  (1.91) 
Notes:  Numbers shown are marginal probabilities derived from probit coefficients of the interaction of each variable with literacy of household head (columns 1-4) and 
household consumption (columns 5-8).  Absolute Z-statistics in parentheses.  School quality variables are measured at administrative post level, except for presence of 
school in village.  Number of observations, mean of dependent variable, and other control variables are the same as in Table 4.      
 
Table 8—Estimation results of school efficiency indicators interacted with head’s literacy and household income 
  Interactions with head’s literacy  Interactions with household income 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Interactions  with:  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls 
Village has EP1 school  -0.101  -0.058  -0.108  -0.001  -0.096  -0.059  -0.096  -0.059  -0.107  -0.319  -0.112  -0.112  -0.104  -0.110 -0.105  -0.110 
  (1.72)  (1.07)  (1.82)  (1.12)  (1.62)  (1.09)  (1.61)  (1.08)  (1.97)  (2.49)  (2.05)  (2.60)  (1.92)  (2.53)  (1.94)  (2.51) 
Previous year pass rate  0.318  0.027              -0.068  -0.109             
  (0.58)  (0.06)              (0.14)  (1.35)             
Female pass rate      0.348  0.475              -0.042  -0.691         
      (0.56)  (0.84)              (0.08)  (1.35)         
Male pass rate      -0.051  -0.407              -0.041  -0.063         
      (0.12)  (1.05              (0.10)  (0.15)         
Pass rate in Portuguese          0.507  0.177              0.617  0.233     
          (1.02)  (0.40)              (1.22)  (0.51)     
Pass rate in Mathematics              0.297  0.168              0.420  0.210 
              (0.59)  (0.38)              (0.82)  (0.47) 
Notes:  Numbers shown are marginal probabilities derived from probit coefficients of the interaction of each variable with literacy of household head (columns 1-4) and 
household consumption (columns 5-8).  Absolute Z-statistics in parentheses.  School efficiency variables are measured at administrative post level, except for presence of 
school in village.  Number of observations,  mean of dependent variable, and other control variables are the same as in Table 5.   
     
 
 
Table 9—Estimation results of school access indicators interacted with head’s literacy and household income 
  Interactions with head’s literacy  Interactions with household income 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Interactions  with:  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys  Girls 
Village has EP1 school  -0.099  -0.056  -0.106  -0.063  -0.101  -0.055  -0.109  -1.128  -0.095  -0.108  -0.103  -0.125 
  (1.66)  (1.00)  (1.77)  (1.13)  (1.68)  (0.97)  (1.92)  (2.95)  (1.75)  (2.41)  (1.80)  (2.88) 
Number of EP1 schools in APs  -0.001  -0.001      -0.001  -0.001  0.001  0.001      0.001  0.000 
  (0.86)  (0.92)      (0.63)  (0.89)  (0.78)  (0.38)      (0.60)  (0.02) 
Number of cement classrooms in AP  -0.001  0.000      0.001  0.000  0.000  0.003      0.000  0.003 
  (1.17)  (0.49)      (0.58)  (0.29)  (0.41)  (2.31)      (0.01)  (2.70) 
EP2 school in AP      -0.013  -0.034  -0.001  -0.032      0.031  0.102  0.024  0.066 
      (0.22)  (0.61)  (0.13)  (0.54)      (0.56)  (2.08)  (0.42)  (1.33) 
Secondary school in AP      -0.059  -0.033  0.047  0.030      -0.027  -0.009  -0.045  -0.092 
      (0.96)  (0.67)  (0.73)  (0.52)      (0.47)  (0.17)  (0.76)  (1.75) 
Notes:  Numbers shown are marginal probabilities derived from probit coefficients of the interaction of each variable with literacy of household head (columns 1-
3) and household consumption (columns 4-6).  Absolute Z-statistics in parentheses.  School access variables are measured at administrative post level, except for 
presence of school in village.  Number of observations,  mean of dependent variable, and other control variables are the same as in Table 6.    38 




Number of schools Number of trained 
teachers 
Pupil teacher ratio 
  (1)  (1a)  (2)  (2a)  (3)  (3a) 
Proportion female heads of household  17.872  -5.273  98.479  22.238  18.139  5.254 
  (1.59)  (0.31)  (2.50)  (0.37)  (1.70)  (0.57) 
 
Proportion household heads literate  9.574  -1.546  118.067  34.116  -4.952  3.395 
  (1.04)  (0.12)  (3.66)  (0.75)  (0.57)  (0.49) 
 
Proportion with adult with EP2  -30.173  0.432  -44.684  -39.888  -28.571  10.809 
  (1.89)  (0.02)  (0.80)  (0.65)  (1.90)  (1.13) 
 
Proportion with female adult with EP1  43.904  37.404  62.081  111.029  45.464  -6.108 
  (3.08)  (2.06)  (1.24)  (1.75)  (3.37)  (0.62) 
 
Median p.c. consumption expenditure  -0.001  0.000  -0.003  0.003  0.000  0.000 
  (0.67)  (0.18)  (0.93)  (0.84)  (0.54)  (0.45) 
 
Mean farm size  -0.027  -0.419  -0.263  -0.751  0.124  -0.780 
  (0.03)  (0.25)  (0.07)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.86) 
             
R-squared (percent)  10.25  83.39  13.51  84.14  11.82  94.70 
F-ratio  3.16  2.49  4.32  2.63  3.71  8.85 
P-value for joint significance of the six 
  SES variables (F-test) 
   
0.30 
   
0.27 
   
0.79 
Notes:  All variables are measured at the administrative post level in rural Mozambique.  There are 
175 observations.  Columns (1a), (2a), and (3a) include district dummy variables.   
 
   
 
Table 11—Policy simulations of impact of school supply investment on rural primary school EP1 enrolment (percent) 
 








Proportion of villages 
with EP1 school 
  (3) 
Policy 1: Build school in 6 
villages per province 
(4) 
Policy 2: Build school in 
12 villages per province 
(5) 
Policy 3: Build school 
in all  villages 
             
Niassa  40  75    10  25  33 
Cabo Delgado  32  95    1  2  2 
Nampula  46  73    5  10  12 
Zambézia  40  54    4  9  20 
Tete  37  52    8  19  38 
Manica  45  67    10  23  33 
Sofala  34  57    9  23  29 
Inhambane  45  67    4  9  13 
Gaza  69  91    5  5  5 
Maputo Province  60  38    16  31  52 
             
All Mozambique  43  67    6  13  20 
Notes:  The simulations are based on the assumption that each school consists of three cement rooms and comes with two trained teachers.  Column (1) gives the 
predicted enrolment for the base model without any simulation.  Provincial differences are generated through interactions with province and number of schools 
in each administrative post, and province and whether village has a school. 
 
   
 
Table 12—Policy simulations of impact of household characteristics on rural primary school EP1 enrolment (percent) 
 
   
 
 
   
Percentage change in enrolment due to: 

















  (4) 
Policy 1: Bring p.c. 
consumption to 25th 
percentile 
(5) 
Policy 2: Bring p.c. 
consumption to 
median 
  (6) 
Policy 3: Give 
literacy to heads in 
bottom quartile 
(7) 
Give literacy to 
heads in bottom 
50th percentile 
                   
Niassa  37  3,588  42    3.8   9.3    49  71 
Cabo Delgado  32  4,441  40    -0.3  -1.2    19  27 
Nampula  49  4,137  48    -0.3  -0.9    10  12 
Zambézia  41  3,659  43    1.9  7.6    10  29 
Tete  38  2,878  39    3.0  6.3    31  46 
Manica  40  3,721  42    1.9  5.8    13  24 
Sofala  32  2,064  49    9.8  16.2    37  42 
Inhambane  46  2,643  46    5.3  12.4    31  41 
Gaza  71  4,307  54    0.2  0.4    5  5 
Maputo Province  64  3,396  52    -0.6  -1.4    15  25 
                   
All Mozambique  44  3,584  45    2.0  5.1    18  28 
Notes:  In column (4), the policy simulation is to bring all households in the bottom quartile up to the consumption of the 25th precentile (Mt. 2,494).  In column (5), the 
policy simulation is to raise consumption of all household below the median to median consumption (Mt. 3,584).  In column (6), the simulation is to make literate all heads 
of household in the bottom quartile of the p.c. consumption distribution.  Column (7) is similar to (6) except applied to all heads below median consumption. 
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Table 13—Summary statistics for children age 7-11  
 
  Girls  Boys 
  Mean  Std  Mean  Std 
         
Log daily per capita consumption  8.154  0.61  8.143  0.64 
Landholdings (hectares)  2.564  2.41  2.590  2.70 
Have irrigation  0.046  0.21  0.046  0.21 
Have agricultural equipment  0.046  0.21  0.042  0.20 
Head literate  0.476  0.50  0.454  0.50 
Adult in household with EP2  0.078  0.27  0.077  0.27 
Adult female in household with EP2  0.109  0.31  0.109  0.31 
Head female  0.187  0.39  0.184  0.39 
Head’s age  45.508  12.80  45.146  12.71 
Currently enrolled in school  0.406  0.49  0.498  0.50 
School characteristics         
 Pupil - Teacher ratio  65.324  18.07  65.157  17.59 
 Number of trained teachers  79.654  66.47  80.414  66.90 
 Proportion of trained female teachers  0.096  0.10  0.094  0.11 
 Proportion of female teachers  0.103  0.12  0.102  0.13 
 Pass rate  0.644  0.05  0.643  0.05 
 Girls pass rate  0.581  0.07  0.580  0.07 
 Boys pass rate  0.676  0.05  0.676  0.05 
 Portuguese subject pass rate  0.663  0.05  0.661  0.05 
 Mathematics subject pass rate  0.683  0.05  0.682  0.05 
 Have school in village  0.685  0.46  0.695  0.46 
 Number of EP1 schools in  









 Have EP2 in administrative post  0.651  0.48  0.657  0.47 
 Have secondary school in administrative 









     
Number of observations  2,293  2,203 
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